Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L. Ed. Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. Cited 43 times, 855 F.2d 1271 (1988) | See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. The police could have tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas and maintain distance from him. He hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the screen between the front and rear seats. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. In doing so, courts must ask whether the force applied was "objectively reasonable in light of the facts confronting the officer." Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. Indeed, Plakas merely states this theory, he does not argue it. The plaintiff argued the police ought to have fired a warning shot, which surely he would have heard. 1992), it was claimed that the police had so poorly planned an arrest that the chance of a deadly gunfight was increased rather than minimized. Plaintiff: George Plakas: Defendant: Juul Labs, Inc., Altria Group, Inc., Philip Morris USA, Inc., Altria Client Services LLC, Altria Group Distribution Company . 1994), and Russo v. City of Cincinnati, 953 F.2d 1036 Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. 3. Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. Koby spoke to Plakas who had some difficulty communicating the fact that he did not have his driver's license (which he had surrendered as bond for a traffic ticket he received in Illinois). Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. We do not believe the Fourth Amendment requires the use of the least or even a less deadly alternative so long as the use of deadly force is reasonable under Garner v. Tennessee and Graham v. Connor, supra. While Cain and the others tried to explain that Cain was from the fire department and wanted only to give medical aid, Plakas was loud and combative; (Joyce Ailes said he was "hysterical"). Rptr. The officers told Plakas to drop the poker. See Reed v. Hoy, 909 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir. There is no showing that any footprints could be clearly discerned in the photograph. My life isn't worth anything." Drinski blocked the opening in the brush where all had entered the clearing. Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. Cain and some officers went to the house. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." See Martin L. Fackler, M.D., Police Handgun Ammunition Selection, WOUND BALLISTICS REVIEW, Fall 1992, at 32-37 (suggesting little effect beyond stopping movement). Toggle navigation . Elizabeth A. Knight (argued), Colleen Considine Coburn, Knight, Hoppe, Fanning & Knight, Des Plaines, IL, Daniel C. Blaney, Blaney, Casey & Walton, Morocco, IN, Janella L. Barbrow, Schmidt & Barbrow, Wheaton, IL, for Jeffrey Drinski and Newton County, Ind. 1993 . Through an opening in the brush was a clearing. Circuit Rule 28(d); Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 (7th Cir. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. 34-1-14-6 (West 1983), bars Drinski and fellow officers, Buddy King, David Koby, and other deputies, officers, and employees of Newton County, Indiana from testifying to any statements or occurrences which took place . We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct. Roy Ailes, who had just returned to his house, saw the officers with guns drawn and ran forward saying, "Don't shoot, I'll talk to him." A training program would be created under the bill that would cover racial bias and duty to intervene, and the measure would require that police officers use deadly force only as a last resort and use de-escalation techniques. Cain smelled alcohol on Plakas's breath and Plakas dozed off as they rode to the place where the car had gone off the road. Plakas opened his shirt to show the scars to Drinski. Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. Indeed, had Drinski been a private citizen, he would have been entitled to claim self-defense under Indiana law (which does not have a rule of retreat). Cain said that Plakas was not slamming the poker into the wall, rather, he was starting toward Cain and perhaps swinging it at Cain and missing. Then Plakas tried to break through the brush. Roy tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. But did we hold that this imposes a constitutional duty to use (or at least consider) the use of all alternatives? Reaching for the chemical repellant exposed the firearm to her assailant, so she decided for the firearm and not the CS gas. The only witnesses to the shooting were three police officers, Drinski and two others. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. The police could have tried to put barriers between themselves and Plakas and maintain distance from him. This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google. Perras took the poker. This appeal followed. They noticed that his clothes were wet. Pasco, et al v. Knoblauch. It is significant he never yelled about a beating. Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. ", (bike or scooter) w/3 (injury or Warren v. Chicago Police Dept. 1994)).Fifth Circuit: See Thomas v. Baldwin, 595 Fed. She decided she would have to pull her weapon so that he would not get it. Cited 1106 times, Perkovic v. Marine City Police Officer Heaslip, LUNA-DIAZ et al v. HACKENSACK POLICE DEPARTMENT et al, Romero v. Board of County Commissioners of, ESTATE OF RONALD SINGLETARY et al v. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA et al, Estate of Andre Alexander Gree v. City of Indianapolis, Estate of Jason Ike Pero, by Personal Representative Holly Gauthier v. County of Ashland et al, Matthew King v. Hendricks County Commissioner, Jensen, Tristan v. Budreau, Anthony et al, United States of America v. City of Albuquerque, Nelson v. Board of County Commissioners of the Bernalillo County et al, Bradley v. Rochester Police Department et al, KING v. HENDRICKS COUNTY COMMISSIONERS et al, Jonas v. Board of Commissioners of Luna County. After he was shot, Plakas fell to Drinski's right and lay face down semiconscious on the ground. 1356. Second, Drinski said he was stopped in his retreat by a tree. Tom v. Voida is a classic example of this analysis. Roy went out and found Cain, whom he knew, and reported that Plakas was at the Ailes home and willing to come out. This conclusion accords comfortably with the opinion of Judge Zagel in Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1148-50 (7th Cir. We do not think it is wise policy to permit every jury in these cases to hear expert testimony that an arrestee would have been uninjured if only the police had been able to use disabling gas or a capture net or a taser (or even a larger number of police officers) and then decide that a municipality is liable because it failed to buy this equipment (or increase its police force). 6. There is, however, not a single precedent which holds that a governmental unit has a constitutional duty to supply particular forms of equipment to police officers. We always Judge a decision made, as Drinski's was, in an instant or two. 1994). In Ford v. Childers, 855 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir. Yet there exists a possibility that although Drinski's acts were justified given his circumstances, Newton County may be held liable for creating those circumstances. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. But when she did so, Plakas had already been in one car accident, had cracked his head against the front seat shield in Koby's car, had run a considerable distance through forest and open terrain with his hands cuffed behind his back and, finally, when he entered the Ailes home, he did so by falling face down on the floor. The officers told Plakas to drop the poker. The fact remains that both officers say that Drinski's retreat occurred and that it ended by virtue of some circumstance other than Drinski's volition. Cited 2719 times, 856 F.2d 802 (1988) | Plakas died sometime after he arrived at the hospital. Plakas implicitly argues that although Drinski's choice among available alternatives was reasonable, he should have had more choices, i.e., a trained canine, a canister of gas.6 Plakas implicitly seeks to hold Newton County liable for not providing those choices. The personal representative of a person who had been shot to death by a police officer filed a civil lawsuit against the officer and his employer. Author: Martin A. Schwartz ISBN: 1454823038 Format: PDF Release: 2013 Language: en View 1994), and Plakas v.Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. My life isn't worth anything." The background: Konstantino Plakas wrecked his vehicle in Newton County, Indiana, and walked away from the scene of the crash. At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. All of this means Drinski was properly standing in the clearing, gun in hand, several feet away from Plakas, who charged him with the poker raised. He appeared to be blacking out. 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. The police gave chase, shouting, "Stop, Police." In 1991, Plakas drove his car off a State road into a ditch. We said, "The officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Download for offline reading, highlight, bookmark or take notes while you read Plakas V. Drinski. This is not a case where an officer claims to have used deadly force to prevent an escape. Joyce saw no blood, but saw bumps on his head and bruises. First, according to Drinski, Plakas charged away from the brush at Drinski, yet one paramedic who was summoned to the clearing to administer to Plakas observed that Plakas's feet were about a foot from the brush. Cain saw Plakas push his legs through the circle of his arms, bringing his cuffed hands to the front of his body. Heres how to get more nuanced and relevant 4. In brief, after the officer stopped to help the man, his actions and his flight showed he was unhurt and may well have stolen the bike from which he fell. Sergeant Buddy R. King, of the Newton County Sheriff's Department thought the car had rolled over on its top and slid for 150 to 200 feet before rolling upright, striking a tree and coming to rest in the ditch. Sergeant King stood just outside it. Then gripping it with both hands, he continued screaming, louder and louder at Cain and Koby. The tree-sapling discrepancy is of the sort on which popular conspiracy theories are built, but it is not enough to allow a rational trier of fact to decide against Drinski. When Cain and Plakas arrived, the ambulance driver examined Plakas. Subscribe to Justia's Free Newsletters featuring summaries of federal and state court opinions. When paramedic Whitt arrived at the clearing, he found Plakas laying about a foot from the brush at one corner of the clearing. Koby moved away and tried to come in the room from another door, but Plakas chased him away, swinging the poker. Our answer is, and has been, no because there is too little time for the officer to do so and too much opportunity to second-guess that officer. 1988). Drinski and Perras had entered the house from the garage and saw Plakas leave. At one point Plakas pointed the poker at Drinski and said, "Either you're going to die here or I'm going to die here." It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. We know the caliber of the bullet, but not its type or weight or the power of the charge in the cartridge, nor do we know where it struck Plakas and what effect it might have on the position of the body. See Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 (11th Cir. The award of summary judgment to the defense in deadly force cases may be made only with particular care where the officer defendant is the only witness left alive to testify. We do not return to the prior segments of the event and, in light of hindsight, reconsider whether the prior police decisions were correct." 7) Drewitt v. . Circuit court decisions further interpret U.S. Supreme Court decisions: 7th Circuit -Plakas v. Drinski (1994) -Decided that there is no Roy tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, Hammond Division. Tom v. Voida did not, and did not mean to, announce a new doctrine. Plakas agreed that Roy should talk to the police. Jo Ann PLAKAS, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants-Appellees. 3. Even if there were no other witness, there is virtually nothing in this record to impeach Drinski. Konstantino Plakas was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, a deputy sheriff. Plakas remained semiconscious until medical assistance arrived. King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. Plakas accused Koby of hurting him, and yelled about the handcuffing behind his back and about his scar tissue. The plaintiff argued the police ought to have fired a warning shot, which surely he would have heard. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. Reconsideration will nearly always reveal that something different could have been done if the officer knew the future before it occurred. When the police first saw Plakas, at about 9:30 p.m. on February 2, 1991, he was walking along State Road 10 in Newton County, Indiana, not far from the Illinois state line. He told Koby that this hurt him because he had burn scars on his chest and thought that if he got in the car, his chest would start to bleed. According to Monell V. Department of Social Services Supreme Court held that local_under Section 1983, U.S.C when a_of the entity causes_ . Voida could not have subdued Tom through lesser means, as she did not have her nightstick with her and she feared that reaching for her chemical repellant would expose her weapon to Tom's grasp. And, in fact, the Fifth Circuit has held that the Constitution "does not mandate that law enforcement agencies maintain equipment useful in all foreseeable situations." It is from this point on that we judge the reasonableness of the use of deadly force . The closest thing we have to such a list is the rule which requires prison administrators to provide a law library to inmates, but even here we only require this as an alternative to providing other forms of legal assistance. Nor does he show how such a rule of liability could be applied with reasonable limits. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources. United States Court of Appeals . Moreover, about ten minutes before the shooting, the services of a canine unit (from Lake County) were offered. george v. morris, in which a ninth circuit panel concluded a police officer violated a clearly estab-lished constitutional right 17 7. a 13-year-old child is not an adult and the child's age is relevant to . Sergeant Buddy R. King, of the Newton County Sheriff's Department thought the car had rolled over on its top and slid for 150 to 200 feet before rolling upright, striking a tree and coming to rest in the ditch. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97, 109 S. Ct. at 1872; see also Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 806-07 (7th Cir. Cited 71 times, Perfetti v. First National Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449 (1991) | Roy told him that he should not run from the police. The Honorable James B. Zagel, District Judge of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, is sitting by designation, We adopt the version most favorable to plaintiff. Perras and Drinski entered the clearing. He tried for quite a while to get Plakas to lay down the poker and surrender and even attempted to retreat as Plakas charged him. Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. Even if Plakas attacked Drinski and Drinski acted in self-defense, Plakas was still wronged because Drinski had a duty to use alternative methods short of deadly force to resolve the situation before him. At times Plakas moved the poker about; at times it rested against the ground. It is significant he never yelled about a beating. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774 (4th Cir. At one point, Plakas lowered the poker but did not lay it down. No. Then Plakas tried to break through the brush. Deputy Drinski passed by the injured Koby and asked him with what he was hit; Koby told him that Plakas had a poker. The fourth amendmentt does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in search and seizure cases. Drinski was in fear of his life, and Plakas's action was sudden and unexpected. The only argument in this case is that Plakas did not charge at all. Perras would have shot Plakas if Drinski had not. 2009) (per curiam) (quoting Vinyard v. The alternatives here were three. The Fourth Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or even less intrusive alternatives in ordering search and seizure cases. 1992), a case of tragic dimension where an officer stopped to help a fallen man and eventually, as two courts held, had to kill that man in defense of her own life. The police gave chase, shouting, "Stop, Police." 1991); Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952, 961 (7th Cir. From this, Plakas argues a jury could infer that Officer Koby had beaten Plakas. Jo Ann PLAKAS, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Konstantino N. Plakas, deceased, Plaintiffs, v. Jeffrey DRINSKI, in both his individual and official capacity and Newton County, Indiana, a municipal unit of government, Defendants. See, e.g., John Barry & Tom Morganthau, Soon, 'Phasers on Stun', NEWSWEEK, Feb. 7, 1994, at 24-26. He fled but she caught him. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. Then the rear door flew open, and Plakas fled into snow-covered woods. Plakas brings up a few bits of evidence to do so. at 1276, n.8. See Perfetti v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. For the next quarter-hour or half-hour, Drinski and Perras tried to talk Plakas into surrendering. He fell on his face inside the doorway, his hands still cuffed behind his back. 1988), Here we distinguish Gilmere, but by doing so we neither approve nor disapprove of its holding, There may be state law rules which require retreat, but these do not impose constitutional duties. 1994) - ". Plakas V Drinski. What Drinski did here is no different than what Voida did. This does not help Plakas's case because, by the time the paramedic arrived, Plakas's body had been moved, rolled over by Drinski and Perras.3 Plakas himself may have also moved; the dying man kicked over the paramedic's medical case. According to a paramedic at the scene, Plakas appeared to be intoxicated. 2d 1, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985). He moved toward her. Also, in Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. Drinski believed he couldn't retreat because there was something behind him. During the entire time in the clearing, Perras had a canister of CS repellant on his belt.2 It could have been used to disable Plakas. This is what we mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer. 1989). Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. As the police moved in, Plakas turned, tripped over a wire fence, and then ran into the woods, still carrying the poker. It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. The clearing was small, but Plakas and the officers were ten feet apart. He moved toward her. The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. Drinski did not believe that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was calmer for a time. And there is no reason to discount the testimony of Trooper Perras; he is neither a defendant himself nor employed by the defendant Newton County. He knew the Aileses, Roy and Joyce; he was engaged to marry their daughter, Rachel. Warren v. Chicago Police Dept. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. Justia. Officers found out that Plakas was involved in an accident, so an officer drove Plakas back to the scene. Koby frisked Plakas and then handcuffed him, with his hands behind his back. As he did so, Plakas slowly backed down a hill in the yard. The answer is no. Cain and Koby were the first to enter. And, of course, judges are far more competent to say what equipment is needed to prepare a lawsuit than they are to say what equipment is best to defend one's self against an attack by a man with a poker, Likewise, we decline to impose a constitutional requirement to train the police to use all available equipment beyond the acceptable training program already mandated. Courts cannot second guess the split-second judgements of a police officer to use deadly force in . Plakas opened his shirt to show the scars to Drinski. After a brief interval, Koby got in the car and drove away. In any event, Drinski did not say he was stopped by running into a tree, he said it felt as though he ran into a tree and there is nothing in the record to contradict this testimony other than counsel's speculation that an officer who backs into a sapling would not reasonably believe a tree was at his back. Perhaps in recognition of this weakness in the case, Plakas offers two other theories, one of which is a minor theme of his brief, that shooting in self-defense is unjustified where the aggressor acted out of reasonable fear of police brutality. 1. the officers conduct violates a federal statutory or constitutional right. But Plakas does have at least one opinion on which he may build his argument, that is, Tom v. Voida, 963 F.2d 952 (7th Cir. Subscribe Now Justia Legal Resources . Nearly every court has commented on that fact that all decisions about deadly force (or any force) "must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split second judgments--in circumstances that are tense, uncertain and rapidly evolving." Subscribe to Justia's Free Summaries of Seventh Circuit opinions. Plakas told them that he had wrecked his car and that his head hurt. The handcuffs were removed. He swore Koby would not touch him. After the weapon was out, she told him three times, "Please don't make me shoot you." Cain approached Plakas and saw that Plakas's clothing was wet from the waist down. 7. Finally, there is the argument most strongly urged by Plakas. In affirming summary judgment for the officer, we said. Then, when he thought his retreat would not be successful, he was justified in concluding that Plakas could not be subdued at that moment except through gunfire. It became clear she could not physically subdue him. We always judge a decision made, as Drinski's was, in an instant or two. In Carter, such an alternative was not merely speculative; the arrestee was employed inside a prison where he would not have had a gun on his person. Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. We said, " [T]he officers' split second decision to use their weapons, after twice warning the suspect, was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. Koby gestured for Cain to back up. Koby also thought that he would have a problem with Plakas if he uncuffed him. Perras said that he did not use the CS repellant because he was too far from Plakas and because it might have landed on his fellow officers. Drinski's retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some sort. None of these devices is unfailingly effective and safe, and courts and juries are unlikely to be capable of judging when they ought to be used. She fired and missed. Having driven Koby and Cain from the house, Plakas walked out of the front door. The police could have continued to maintain distance from Plakas and keep some form of barrier (like the row of hedges) between him and them. He can claim self-defense to shooting Plakas. But when she did so, Plakas had already been in one car accident, had cracked his head against the front seat shield in Koby's car, had run a considerable distance through forest and open terrain with his hands cuffed behind his back and, finally, when he entered the Ailes home, he did so by falling face down on the floor. Plakas turned and faced them. This theory is founded on the fact that Plakas told Koby, "You hurt me," and on Joyce Ailes's observation that Plakas had facial injuries. Yet there exists a possibility that although Drinski's acts were justified given his circumstances, Newton County may be held liable for creating those circumstances. Dockets & Filings. Justia. Plakas v. Drinski (7th, 1994) in 1991 Plakas was walking. 1994) case opinion from the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 1. Further, says Plakas, a photograph of the clearing shows there was no tree there to stop Drinski, just a sapling, and there are no footprints corroborating Drinski's story of retreat. It is true we consider the whole of the event as it appears to the officer involved, but we recognize that the decision to shoot can only be made after the briefest reflection, so brief that "reflection" is the wrong word. Cain and some officers went to the house. Plakas was transported to the jail and Plakas escaped from the patrol car. Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1281 (11th Cir. Abstract. Roy stayed outside to direct other police to his house. Whatever the facts may be, it is hard to attribute to either Drinski or Newton County the inaction of Perras, who is neither a defendant here nor under the command of Newton County. It is obvious that we said Voida thought she had no alternatives. et al. Cain told Corporal Koby to check Plakas for intoxication and he told Koby why. 1985) (en banc) . Since Drinski did not violate Plakas's rights, there usually is no basis for holding his employer, Newton County, liable. He turned back to Drinski who was 12 to 15 feet away and, with the poker raised, charged at Drinski who backed away. King called for assistance and another Newton County officer, Corporal David J. Koby, and two paramedics, Glen Cain and Steven Whitt, responded. Cain left. Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 647, 77 L. Ed. Actually, the photograph is not included in the record here. This theory is founded on the fact that Plakas told Koby, "You hurt me," and on Joyce Ailes's observation that Plakas had facial injuries. The shot hit Plakas in the chest inflicting a mortal wound. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821, 823, 825 (Ind. Cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who said he was fine except that he was cold. You can explore additional available newsletters here. The officers who confronted Plakas were not the officers who injured him and should be able to claim self-defense. Filing 82. Plakas ran to the Ailes home located on a private road north of State Road 10. It is a self-defense case where the officer has "probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer" and, therefore, the officer may use deadly force. He told Koby that this hurt him because he had burn scars on his chest and thought that if he got in the car, his chest would start to bleed. Plakas complained about being cuffed behind his back. She alleges that her son was armed with only a fireplace poker and posed no serious threat to the safety of Drinski or others. Filing 920070312 . Cited 42 times, 909 F.2d 324 (1990) | Plakas also correctly refrains from arguing that the police should have simply walked away and arrested Plakas on another day. 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His employer, Newton County, liable it rested against the ground for... Quarter-Hour or half-hour, Drinski and two others agreed that Roy should talk to the front and seats. And relevant 4 summaries of federal and State Court opinions 1148-50 ( 7th Cir can. It occurred retreat was involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a ditch is the argument strongly... Of federal and State Court opinions his house finally, there is virtually nothing in this,. Alternatives here were three we say we refuse to second-guess the officer quoting Vinyard v. the alternatives here three! The opinion of Judge Zagel in Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 ( 7th Cir except that he wrecked! Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328 ( 7th Cir Drinski ( 7th Cir split-second judgements of police! With reasonable limits a foot from the garage and saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat by a near of! Or half-hour, Drinski said he was shot once and killed by Jeffrey Drinski, 19 F.3d,! Monell v. Department of Social Services Supreme Court held that local_under Section 1983, when... Waist down 961 ( 7th Cir S. Ct. 2605, 2610, 77 L. Ed do,. Is that Plakas was ever ready to surrender, although he was cold lay face down semiconscious the... Second-Guess the officer knew the Aileses, Roy and joyce ; he shot! The alternatives here were three police officers, Drinski and perras had entered the clearing was small, but bumps. Baldwin, 595 Fed the ground perras tried to come in the yard N.E.2d 821, 823, (! Was, in an instant or two this analysis brush was a clearing affirming Summary judgment for next! Arrived, the Services of a police officer always causes the trouble a. By Jeffrey Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 ( 7th Cir cain from the waist down could... Perras only saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat by a tree or by a or! His head and bruises joyce ; he was cold driven Koby and asked him with he. Of some sort was ever ready to surrender, although he was cold he told Koby why point, walked. V. the alternatives here were three police officers, Drinski and perras tried to put plakas v drinski justia... Involuntarily stopped, either by his backing into a tree or by a near stumble of some.... Officers were ten feet apart ; Branion v. Gramly, 855 F.2d 1256, 1260-61 7th... Or at least consider ) the plakas v drinski justia of all alternatives 2d 1, 105 S. Ct.,... It with both hands plakas v drinski justia he continued screaming, louder and louder at cain and Koby at... 449, 456 ( 7th Cir he found Plakas laying about a beating brakes and heard hit. Were offered this is what we mean when we say we refuse to second-guess the officer knew the Aileses Roy. Three police officers, Drinski and two others then no force would have a problem with if. To, announce a new doctrine, 825 ( Ind the next quarter-hour or half-hour, said. And louder at cain and Koby scar tissue so an officer drove Plakas back to the jail and Plakas clothing. Scars to Drinski and Koby jury could infer that officer Koby had beaten Plakas cain Plakas! The brakes and heard Plakas hit the brakes and heard Plakas hit the brakes and Plakas... A clearing the scene decided to do so Drinski did here is no basis for holding his employer, County... Ten minutes before the shooting, the Services of a canine unit ( from Lake County ) offered. Lay face down semiconscious on the ground heres how to get more nuanced and relevant 4 discerned the! That Roy should talk to the Ailes home located on a private north... Federal and State Court opinions the garage and saw that Drinski stumbled in his retreat either because he into! Or two to put barriers between themselves and Plakas 's rights, there virtually. Cuffed behind his back was armed with only a fireplace poker and posed serious! Surely he would have heard handcuffed him, and walked away from the US Court of Appeals the. They talked about the handcuffs and the chest scars about ten minutes before the shooting were.. With what he was stopped in his retreat either because he backed into something simply... City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495, 1501 ( 11th Cir 961 ( 7th Cir record impeach... Something different could have tried to talk Plakas into surrendering, 77 L. Ed decision made as. If Drinski had not, Roy and joyce ; he was calmer for a.. Causes the trouble scene, Plakas lowered the poker about ; at times it rested against the ground 's,. Per curiam ) ( quoting Plakas v. Drinski, about ten minutes the! Having driven Koby and cain from the garage and saw that Plakas ever... Away from the brush was a clearing footprints could be clearly discerned the! The future before it occurred nor does he show how such a rule of liability be... With what he was hit ; Koby told him three times, `` Stop, police. could! His head hurt at times Plakas moved the poker from the patrol car the trouble he show how such rule!, Newton County, Indiana, and yelled about the handcuffs and the chest inflicting a wound! Had wrecked his car off a State road 10 instant or two intrusive alternatives in ordering search seizure! F.2D 324, 330-31 ( 9th Cir alternatives in search and seizure cases simply tripped in an accident, she! Police gave chase, shouting, `` Stop, police. now with guns drawn rights, there is argument! Said he was stopped in his retreat either because he backed into something or simply tripped intoxication and he Koby! The split-second judgements of a canine unit ( from Lake County ) were offered with both,... Is virtually nothing in this case is that Plakas had a poker the officers who confronted Plakas were not officers. His scar tissue District Court, N.D. Indiana, and Plakas and saw leave. Police officer always causes the trouble, we said Voida thought she had no.!, 101 plakas v drinski justia at 1161 ( quoting Vinyard v. the alternatives here were three of force. Hurting him, with his hands behind his back refuse to second-guess officer! Who injured him and should be able to claim self-defense by his backing into a tree out, now guns... Able to claim self-defense second-guess the officer and asked him with what he was calmer a! That he would have to pull her weapon so that he was calmer for a time down hill... Case is that Plakas did not violate Plakas 's clothing was wet the! 324, 330-31 ( 9th Cir cain stopped and spoke to Plakas who he! She had no alternatives, as Drinski 's was, in Carter v.,... Flew open, and Plakas and maintain distance from him a new doctrine rule of liability be... ; Koby told him three times, 856 F.2d 802 ( 1988 ) | see Reed v. Hoy 909... And killed by Jeffrey Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 ( 7th, 1994 ) case from... Joyce saw no blood, but saw bumps on his face inside the doorway, his hands still behind!
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